This paper presents a simulation of research behaviour, focusing on the process of writing papers, submitting them to journals and conferences, reviewing them, and accepting/rejecting them. The simulation is currently used to evaluate the OpinioNet reputation model, which calculates the reputation of researchers and research work based on the propagation of opinions amongst related entities. The goal is to verify whether the reputation model succeeds in encouraging 'good' research behaviour or not, although the simulator is elaborate enough to be used for the analysis of other aspects of paper writing, submission, and review processes.
Background
Reputation is widely understood as a group's opinion about the entity in question. The OpinioNet reputation model [3] is based on the concept that in the case of the lack of explicit opinions, opinions may be deduced from related entities. For instance, in the field of publications, one may assume that if a paper has been accepted by a reputable conference, then the paper should be of a minimum quality. Similarly, a conference becomes reputable if it accepts high quality papers. OpinioNet is essentially based on this notion of opinion propagation in structural graphs, such as the publications graphs (where nodes of this graph may represent knowledge objects, such as conference proceedings and conference papers, and relations state which node is part of which other).
OpinioNet understands opinions as probability distributions over an evaluation space (such as {poor, good, v.good, excellent}), for a particular attribute (such as novelty of work), and at a moment in time. OpinioNet then defines the structural graph accordingly: SG = N, G, O, E, A, T, E, F , where N is the set of nodes, G is the set of researchers that may generate opinions about nodes, O is the set of all opinions that researchers may hold, E is the ordered evaluation space for O (e.g. E = {poor, good, v.good, excellent}), A is the set of attributes that opinions may address (for instance, A = {novelty, clarity, signif icance, correctness}), T represents calendar time, E ⊆ N × N specifies which nodes are part of the structure of which others (i.e. (n, n ) ∈ E implies n is part of n ), F : G × N × A × T → O is a relation that links a given researcher, node, attribute, and time to their corresponding opinion.
A single opinion is then represented as the probability distribution P(E|G, N, A, T ) ∈ O. We note that probability distributions subsume classical approaches and are more informative. Hence, the adoption of this approach by our simulator does not necessarily restrict its application to other scenarios (and translation between different reputation measures, including probability distributions, is presented by [6, 3, 2] ).
Simulation Basics
In theory, it is researchers' behaviour (defined through their profiles) that would influence the creation and evolution of papers, journals, and, eventually, fields of research. However, to keep the simulation simple, our example focuses on the evolution of one specific aspect of a research community -namely, the growth of the community's contributions -and neglects other aspects that are not deemed crucial for the evaluation of the reputation module -such as the rise and fall of the community itself, its journals, its fields of research, etc. As such, and for the sake of simplifying the simulation, we choose to simulate a single community with a fixed number of researchers researching a given subject; we say it is the researchers' profiles that control the production and dissemination of single contributions; and we keep the number of journals that could accept/reject these contributions fixed. In other words, we say one 'top rated' journal is sufficient to represent the acceptance of a contribution by any 'top rated' journal. We argue that since our current interest is in the future of authors' contributions (such as papers or book chapters), the number of journals becomes irrelevant: what is crucial is the quality of the journals (if any) that accept the authors' contributions. In what follows, we define the simulator's input and output, followed by the journals' and researchers' profiles that define their behaviour.
The Simulator's Input and Output
The simulator requires the following tuple as input: SG 0 , J, U, J , U, T , where SG 0 describes the initial state of the system (or the initial SG graph), which should include at least a fixed number of researchers and journals; J describes the set of journal profiles (defined shortly); U describes the set of researcher profiles (defined shortly); J ⊆ N × J is a function that maps a journal in N (where N is the set of knowledge objects in SG 0 ) to a journal profile in J; U ⊆ G × U is a function that maps a researcher in G (where G is the set of researchers in SG 0 ) to a researcher profile in U ; and T ∈ N * describes the number of years to be simulated. Then, every simulation year Y results in a modified structural graph SG Y . The evolution of the SG graph is then presented as E SG = {SG 0 , · · · , SG T }.
Journals' Profiles
Journals are categorised through profiles that define their quality and their required number of reviewers. A journal's profile j ∈ J is defined as the tuple: j = J, RN , where similar to the opinions on quality, J is a probability distribution over the evaluation space E describing the quality of the journal; 1 and RN describes the number of reviewers needed to review a paper, and it is specified as a Gaussian function over the set of natural numbers N.
The rules for accepting/rejecting contributions depends on the quality of the journal J. For example, very good journals are very strict about the quality of the papers they accept, other lower quality ones are not as strict. Hence, a journal's acceptance threshold AT may be defined in terms of its quality J. A preliminary definition could be to have AT= emd(J, T), where T = {e n → 1} (where ∀e i ∈ E · e n > e i ) describes the ideal distribution, or the best quality possible, and emd is the earth movers distance that calculates the distance (whose range is [0, 1], where 0 represents the minimum distance and 1 represents the maximum possible distance) between two probability distributions [5] . 2 
Researchers' Profiles
Similar to journals, researchers' behaviour is also categorised through profiles that define their quality, their productivity, etc. A researcher's profile u ∈ U is defined as the tuple u = Q, RP, CN, C, CA, CP, SS, RvP, RV, RT , where:
-Q describes the researcher's research quality, and it is specified as a probability distribution over the evaluation space E (we assume that researchers have a fixed and 'intrinsic' quality of research -Sect. 5 argues the need for this intrinsic value -which is different from reputation values that reflect the view of the community and are calculated by reputation algorithms); -RP describes the research productivity in terms of the produced number of papers per year (since produced research work is usually presented and preserved through papers, whether published or unpublished), and it is specified as a Gaussian function over the set of natural numbers N; -CN describes the researcher's usual number of coauthors per contribution, and it is specified as a Gaussian function over the set of natural numbers N; -C describes the accepted research quality of coauthors, and it is specified as a probability distribution over the evaluation space E; -CA describes the accepted affinity level of coauthors (currently, affinity measure describes how close are two researchers' profiles; however, in future simulations, one may also consider affinity measures that describe how close are two researchers with respect to numerous social relations), and the range of its value is the interval [0, 1], where the value 0 represents minimum affinity and the value 1 represents maximum affinity; -CP describes the level of persistency in sticking with old coauthors, it is defined in terms of the number of past papers that two researchers have coauthored together, and it is specified as a Gaussian function over the set of natural numbers N; -SS describes the submission strategy of the researcher, and the range of its value is the interval [−1, +1], where a value −1 represents an extreme 'risk-averse' strategy in which the researcher does not submit a paper to any journal unless its paper is of the highest quality possible, a value of +1 represents an extreme 'risk-seeking' strategy in which the researcher doesn't mind submitting a paper to a journal of much higher quality, and the value 0 represents a more neutral approach in which the researcher usually submits its papers to journals of the same quality (of course, values in between represent different levels of risk-averse and risk-seeking strategies); 3 -RvP describes the researcher's review productivity in terms of the number of papers the researcher accepts to review per year, and it is specified as a Gaussian function over the set of natural numbers N;
-RV describes the review quality in terms of how close the researcher's reviews are from the true quality of the papers in question, it is defined in terms of the distance from the true quality of the paper in question, and the range of this distance is the interval [−1, +1]; and -RT describes the reviewers' threshold for accepting to review a paper for a given journal, it is defined in terms of the earth mover's distance between the reviewer's quality of research and that of the journal's, and the range of its value is the interval [0, 1].
We note that although the researchers' profiles may seem too complex, many ideas have already been overly simplified (as illustrated by Sect. 5.1), and additional simplifications are straightforward (if needed).
Simulation Algorithm
While the previous section has introduced the simulator as a black box, this section presents an overview of the simulation algorithm. (For the simulator's technical details, we refer the interested reader to our technical document [2] .) The algorithm's steps are outlined below.
1. Generate the groups of coauthors for the given year.
The idea is that each group of coauthors will produce one paper that will then be added to the SG graph. In summary, the algorithm selects the authors one by one, giving the authors that intend to write more papers this year (specified by the research productivity RP of the researcher) a higher probability of being selected first. Then, for each selected author, the algorithm searches, in an iterated manner, for a suitable group of coauthors, where 'suitability' is based on the restrictions imposed by each researcher through its preferred number of coauthors (CN), the accepted quality of coauthors (C), the accepted affinity of coauthors (CA), and the accepted persistency of coauthors (CP). The algorithm iterates until all researchers are assigned to as many coalitions as needed. 2. Then, for each paper resulting from a created group of coauthors, the simulator performs the following: (a) Calculate the intrinsic quality of the paper. We base our simulation on the idea that papers have a true quality that researchers (or reviewers) often try to guess. Of course, in reality, this value does not exist (and if it did, it definitely would not be static, but a continuously evolving one). However, simulation may assume such values to compare and analyse the performance of researchers. We assume that when researchers from various qualities (where a researcher's true quality is specified by the parameter Q) are grouped together then the resulting paper's true value would be based on the researchers' true value. How a paper's intrinsic quality is calculated is illustrated shortly by (1). (b) Choose the journal to submit the paper to.
After a paper is created, it is submitted to some journal. The selection of the journal assumes that researchers tend to have certain submission strategies (specified through the parameter SS), and the submission strategy for a given journal is an aggregation of its authors'. 4 The calculated submission strategy of a paper is then used to help select the journal to submit the paper to by enforcing constraints on the distance between the paper's true quality (calculated by step 2(a) above) and that of the journal's (J). (c) Choose the reviewers to review the paper.
This action is based on the number of reviews needed RN, the availability of the reviewers (researchers are assumed to review a certain number of papers per year, determined by RvP, and they accept the journals' requests to review papers based on a first come first serve basis), the quality of the researcher Q, the quality of the journal J, and the reviewer's threshold for accepting a journal (RT). (d) Generate the reviewers' opinions (reviews) about the paper in question.
Reviewers' opinions are based on the intrinsic quality of the paper (calculated by step 2(a) above) and the researcher's review quality (RV), which determines how close the review would be to the paper's true value. (e) Accept/Reject the paper by the chosen journal.
This calculation is based on the quality of the journal J, the journal's acceptance threshold (AT), and the reviewers' aggregated opinions, where the aggregation takes into consideration the reviewers' reputation at the time for weighing each opinion accordingly. Note that if the paper is accepted, then it is linked in the SG graph to the journal through the part of relation. (f) Reputation measures are calculated by OpinioNet.
After reviews are created and papers are accepted/rejected accordingly, the simulator calls the OpinioNet reputation model to calculate the reputation of papers based on the new reviews and acceptance results, as well as to calculate the authors' reputation based on the reputation of their papers. 3. Repeat the entire process for the following year.
Note that the algorithm terminates after simulating a pre-defined number of years, or time-steps, T.
Due to space limitations, we suffice with the presented general overview of the simulation algorithm. However, for further technical details, we refer the interested reader to Algorithms 3-8 of our technical document [2] .
After introducing the proposed simulation algorithm, and before moving on to the experiments and results, this section is intended to clarify our stance by highlighting and discussing the assumptions we make as well as clarifying the claims the simulation algorithm is designed to test.
Assumptions
As discussed earlier, trying to simulate the actual behaviour of researchers requires a thorough study of various aspects, from how people choose their coauthors and how they choose where to submit their work to, to how do journals select reviewers, and how is the quality of a paper related to the research quality of its authors. We argue that the proposed simulation algorithm is sophisticated enough to capture the actions that have an impact on reputation measures (such as calculating the true quality of papers), yet it is simplified enough to overlook unnecessary complicated behaviour (such as representing all good quality journals as one). As a result, a bunch of assumptions are made, which we discuss below. We note that many of the fixed values that we refer to in our assumptions are in fact either drawn from a predefined Gaussian function, or some noise is added to them to make our scenarios more realistic.
On the Static Nature of the Research Community. We say both the community and the researchers' behaviour are static: researchers do not join or leave the community; journals do not evolve or die; the field of research is fixed; each paper cites a fixed number of other papers; a researcher's productivity does not change with time; a researcher's quality of research does not evolve with time; a researcher's review productivity does not evolve with time; a researcher's review quality does not evolve with time and his reviews always fall at a fixed distance from that of the true quality of the paper being reviewed; a researcher's submission strategy does not evolve with time; a researcher's acceptable journal quality for reviewing papers is fixed; and journals do not evolve and they always accept papers of the same quality.
These assumptions are introduced to keep the simulation simple. We postpone the study of dynamic and evolving behaviour for future work. However, to keep the simulation more realistic, recall that some randomness is introduced when generating the measures specifying a 'fixed' (or 'static') behaviour.
On Selecting Coauthors. Selecting the coauthors to collaborate with is usually a complex matter that depends on a variety of issues, such as the subject of study, the practicality of collaboration, and so on. Our proposed simulator, however, is not aimed at studying the dynamics of human relations, their collaboration, and coalition formations, but the production of papers on an annual basis. Hence, for simplicity, the production of papers assumes researchers produce a fixed number of papers per year, and coauthor their papers with a group of other researchers. Again, for simplicity, we assume the strategy of selecting coauthors is 'fixed' and that coauthors are selected based on their quality, their affinity, and their persistence. Of course, different weights may be given to each.
On the True Quality of Researchers and Research Work. Although in reality the true quality of a researcher is neither definite nor accessible, we do assume that researchers have defined true and fixed qualities. The notion of a 'true' quality value of researchers has some ground in real life. For instance, some behaviour (such as looking for future collaborators, selecting who to give a funding to, etc.) assumes researchers to be of a certain quality, and their research work to follow that quality respectively. We also believe a good reviewer is one that can be as objective as possible by assessing the 'true' quality of the paper (whatever that may mean) free from any biases. Following in those footsteps, the proposed simulation states that the true quality of a paper is based on the true quality of its authors, and the review quality of a researcher depends on how close his opinions are to the true quality of the paper in question.
But how is the true quality of the paper calculated? We say when researchers from various qualities are grouped together then the resulting paper's true (quality) value would be based on the researchers' true (quality) values. However, we also assume that in the worst case scenario, the quality of a research work adopts the quality of the best coauthor. In the best case scenario, when coauthors are all of very good quality, the quality of a research work follow a more superadditive nature. In other words, when very good quality coauthors work together, they can produce work of higher quality compared to what each coauthor can produce on their own. In other words, the effect that a single researcher has on the true quality of a paper is dependent on its quality of coauthors. The equation we propose for calculating a paper's true value X is then:
where,Q represents the highest quality in the list of the true qualities of the coauthors {Q a1 , · · · , Q an }, T = {e n → 1} (where ∀e i ∈ E ·e n > e i ) describes the best quality possible,q represents the mean of the coauthors' qualities {q a1 , · · · , q an } (where q ai = emd(Q ai , T)), and α is a tuning factor. 5 In summary, the above equation states that when the average quality of coauthors is low (i.e. 0.5 <q ≤ 1), then the quality of the paper adopts the quality of the best coauthor (Q). However, when the average quality of coauthors is high (i.e. 0 ≤q ≤ 0.5), then the quality of the paper follows a superadditive function that increases the quality of the best coauthor (Q) towards the best quality possible (T), based on the average quality of the authors (q) and a tuning factor (α).
On Selecting the Journal to Submit a Paper to. We say researchers have different, and 'fixed', submission strategies. We define submission strategies following the prospect theory classification of strategies into risk seeking, risk averse, and risk neutral ones. The submission strategy of a paper is then an aggregation of its authors'. For example, if the submission strategy is 'risk seeking', then the paper may be submitted to some journal which is of better quality. If the submission strategy is 'risk averse', then the paper cannot be submitted to a journal unless it is of higher quality. Of course, varying levels of these strategies are considered.
On Selecting Reviewers. Journals usually try to get good reviewers, based on availability. But how do reviewers choose whether to accept/reject reviewing papers for a given journal? We assume that reviewers accept journals based on a first come first serve basis, as long as the journal is of acceptable quality and the reviewer is available to do more reviews.
On Accepting/Rejecting Papers by a Given Journal. We assume accepting/rejecting a paper is only based on reviewers' opinions, and not on the number of papers submitted, the acceptance rate, etc. This is necessary because we have already assumed the number of journals to be fixed. In other words, we say one journal of a given quality is enough to represent all potential journals of that same quality. Furthermore, when accepting/rejecting a paper, the journal's editors do not base their decision on the true quality of the paper (since this information is not available), but on the aggregated reviewers' opinions. When aggregating reviewers' opinions, we say that the reliability of a review (or opinion) is based on the researcher's current reputation in his/her community (as calculated by the Opin-ioNet algorithm), rather than how confident he claims to be (which is how the current review process works). We believe this is a stronger reliability measure since the reviewer does not assess himself, but is assessed by the community.
On the Fate of Papers. Finally, we say that, for the sake of simplicity, both accepted and rejected papers are forgotten. Neither of them is submitted to other journals in the following years; only new papers are created each year. In practice these new papers would in fact be a modification of (i.e. a new version of) already existing ones. However, we currently postpone the simulation of the version of relation that links related papers for future simulations. This assumption is acceptable since the current simulation simply focuses on the number of papers accepted by journals and the quality of the journals that accept them, rather than the evolution of papers.
Hypotheses
The OpinioNet reputation model has been used in an attempt to encourage 'good' research behaviour [2] . The proposed simulator aims at verifying whether OpinioNet achieves its goal or not through testing the following hypotheses.
The better the quality of the researcher, the less susceptible they are to the quality of their coauthors.
Hypothesis 2. It is more profitable to follow a risk-neutral submission strategy.
Hypothesis 3. It is more profitable to produce few high quality papers than several lower quality ones.
The first hypothesis implies that established top researchers can afford to work with lower quality researchers (such as new PhD students) and still maintain their reputation. However, lower quality researchers are better off collaborating with researchers that are of better quality than themselves in order to increase the quality of their papers, and hence, their reputation (recall that a researcher's true intrinsic quality remains fixed in our simulation). Naturally, this hypothesis is highly influenced by our assumption that the quality of a research work is equal or greater than the quality of the best author. In any case, this issue is revisited when discussing the results of the simulation testing this hypothesis.
The second hypothesis implies that it is more profitable, in terms of reputation, to submit one's contributions to journals that lie in the same quality range of the paper. For instance, if authors choose journals that are much better, then they end up wasting the community's time and resources, and they also waste time before their work is accepted. However, if the authors choose journals that are of much lower quality than the work submitted, then they miss the chance of having this work published in more reputable journals. Naturally, proving/disproving this hypothesis will be influenced by the assumption that papers may only be submitted once. We believe resubmitting usually requires the creation of news versions, which we postpone for future (and more advanced) simulations. Nevertheless, the current simulation may illustrate the effort, time, and potential gain in reputation that could be wasted by preferring one submission strategy over another.
The third hypothesis implies that it would be more profitable, in terms of reputation, to spend more time on producing few high quality research papers than numerous papers of lower quality. This, we believe, lowers the dissemination overhead in researchers' contributions and encourages researchers to spend more time on high quality research, as opposed to wasting time on repackaging already existing ideas for the sole purpose of increasing reputation.
The following section presents the results of the simulations that were run to test the above three hypotheses.
For our simulation, we choose to simulate a research community composed of a fixed set of 3 journals and 45 researchers. The 3 journals represent a top journal, a mediocre one, and a poor one. The 45 researchers are divided into three main categories (15 authors per category) that represent top quality researchers, mediocre ones, and poor ones. The simulation then runs for 10 time-steps, where each time-step represents one calendar year. In other words, our simulated example represents a fixed community of 45 researchers with varying behaviour and its evolution over 10 years.
At each time-step, papers are added following the constraints of the various profiles. With the addition of each paper, the following measures are calculated: first, the OpinioNet reputation of the papers affected by this addition, and second, the OpinioNet reputation of authors affected by this addition. The evolution of these measures along time is then plotted for further analysis.
Evaluating Hypothesis 1. Recall that researchers are already divided into 3 groups: top quality researchers, mediocre ones, and poor ones. In this experiment, we divide the researchers of each group into 3 sub-groups: those that collaborate with top quality authors, those that collaborate with mediocre authors, and those that collaborate with low quality authors. All the other values defining the researchers' profiles are kept fixed on average values. For example, all researchers' submission strategies are 'risk-neutral'.
The results are presented by Figs. 1, 2 , and 3. Note that solid lines represent the reputation of the authors that collaborate with top quality authors, dashed lines represent the reputation of the authors that collaborate with mediocre authors, and dotted lines represent the reputation of authors that collaborate with low quality authors. The range of a reputation measure, as enforced by Opin-ioNet, is [0, 1], where 0 represents the worst reputation possible and 1 represents the best. Hence, a change in reputation that may visually seem rather slight, could be substantively significant. Also note that since there are 5 authors in each sub-category, the represented values are the mean obtained for all authors in a given category. For this reason, we believe there is no need to repeat each simulation more than once, since we are already analysing the mean of 5 authors. Figure 1 illustrates that top quality researchers are not very susceptible to the quality of their coauthors. On the other hand, Fig. 2 illustrates that mediocre researchers can do much better if they collaborate with top quality researchers. And the most susceptible of all are poor quality researchers who can do better by collaborating with mediocre researchers, and much better by collaborating with top quality researchers, as illustrated by Fig. 3 .
Naturally, these results are the effect of our assumption that the quality of a research work is equal to or greater than the quality of the best author. However, even with a much more lenient assumption that computes the quality of a paper to be the mean of the quality of its authors, we still obtain similar results (which we do not present in this paper due to space limitations), although with much milder curves, compared to those of Figs. 2 and 3.
In summary, our results confirm Hypothesis 1, which states that the better the quality of the researcher, the less susceptible they are to the quality of their coauthors. Evaluating Hypothesis 2. In this experiment, we divide the researchers of each group (i.e. the top quality researchers, the mediocre ones, and the low quality ones) into 3 sub-groups: those with a 'risk-seeking' submission strategy, those with a 'risk-neutral' submission strategy, and those with a 'risk-averse' submission strategy. All the other values defining their profiles are kept fixed on average values.
The results of this experiment are presented by Fig. 4 , where solid lines represent the reputation of the authors with a 'risk-seeking' submission strategy, dashed lines represent the reputation of the authors with a 'risk-neutral' submission strategy, and dotted lines represent the reputation of authors with a 'risk-averse' submission strategy. Again, the represented values are the mean obtained for all authors in a given category. Figure 4 refutes Hypothesis 2, which states that it is more profitable to follow a risk-neutral submission strategy, by showing that it is only the top researchers that are susceptible to changes in the submission strategy, and the 'risk-neutral' strategy need not be the ideal one. It seems that the submission strategy does not have a major impact on low quality and mediocre researchers. However, top researchers should continue to give their best (i.e. by submitting to top quality journals regularly); otherwise, their reputation would decrease with lower quality journals (as well as with the decay of information, as enforced by the OpinioNet reputation model which assumes that the value of any piece of information decreases with time [3] ). To understand this simulation better, we repeat the same experiment, modifying the intrinsic quality of the researcher to evolve by adopting the researcher's reputation. This assumes that researchers intrinsic quality can get better or worse with time, depending on where they publish. Of course, this is a strong assumption, but it is a simplification which is good enough to represent that a researcher can get better by climbing the ladder one step at a time. 6 The results are presented in Fig. 5 , which illustrates that low quality researchers can now learn from their experiences, and when they get their papers accepted in higher quality journals, their intrinsic quality increases, making it possible for them to climb the ladder one step at a time. Evaluating Hypothesis 3. In this experiment, we divide the researchers of each group (i.e. the top quality researchers, the mediocre ones, and the low quality ones) into 3 sub-groups: those with a high productivity level, those with a medium productivity level, and those with low quality research and a high productivity level. We note that the productivity level represents the number of papers produced per year. 7 Again, all the other values defining the researchers' profiles are kept fixed on average values. The results of this experiment are presented by Fig. 6 , where solid lines represent the reputation of authors with a high productivity level, dashed lines represent the reputation of authors with a mediocre productivity level, and dotted lines represent the reputation of authors with a low productivity level. Again, the represented values are the mean obtained for all authors in a given category.
The results show that those who focus on the quantity cannot do any better than those who focus on the quality of their work, confirming hypothesis 3, which states that it is more profitable to produce few high quality papers than several low quality ones. 
Conclusion
This paper has presented a simulator that simulates the details of the publication process, from writing papers and submitting them to journals, to the review process and the final decision of accepting/rejecting papers. The simulator is rich enough to be used in analysing different aspects of the publication process. However, this paper has focused on using it to verify the OpinioNet reputation model's success in encouraging 'good' behaviour, such as encouraging the focus on the quality of work produced as opposed to its quantity. Further analysis could still be done on hypotheses 1-3. We also plan to extend our future simulations for testing additional hypotheses such as: Is it more profitable to repackage one's research work into different versions? Additionally, future work may also consider (and simulate) citations as another source of opinions, take into consideration the evolution of papers by introducing new versions, and so on.
